

# JOINT TASK FORCE DESIGN IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A Monograph  
By  
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Infantry



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## **Abstract**

In 1989 and 1991, the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear examples of the effects of this learning experience. In addition, these operations benchmark the nation's capability to achieve national policy objectives in a less constrained world stage. In this author's view, these victories mark a new era of learning in the military community. In other words, the OOTW learning experience for the Post Cold War military compares with the Vietnam Era for the Post World War II warrior. For a generation of soldiers, OOTW represents a different enemy in an unstable political environment. Although political events will shape this emerging battlefield, it also demands that the military adopt an intellectual framework that is not force destruction based. In fact, this new enemy, which ranges from a disaster to a criminal organization, cannot be defeated by applying traditional combat power. Despite this altered mental image of the battlefield, the dangers inherent in misjudging it are the same; namely mission failure. The military's ability to do OOTW missions is already shaping its relevance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. As the United States attempts to remain engaged in the world and enlarge its democratic spectrum, doing these missions well is important to national policy. The organization of choice for the modern military to cope in this environment is the Joint Task Force (JTF).

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## CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

*Much of the success of the joint force hinges on the Joint Force Commander's capability to integrate the capabilities of the joint team and synchronize their full dimensional efforts. When Joint Force Commanders fully understand the capabilities of subordinate forces and the strategic and operational environment in which they conduct operations, and organize joint forces for flexible and responsive combat, powerful operational leverage can be achieved in all dimensions of combat operations.*

*General (Retired) Colin L. Powell*

In 1989 and 1991, the US Army dramatically proved that it had learned from its failure in Vietnam. Just as FM 100-5 Operations represented a fundamental shift in Army's approach to warfare, so too Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm offered clear examples of the effects of this learning experience. In addition, these operations benchmark the nation's capability to achieve national policy objectives in a less constrained world stage. In this author's view, these victories mark a new era of learning in the military community. In other words, the OOTW learning experience for the Post Cold War military compares with the Vietnam Era for the Post World War II warrior. For a generation of soldiers, OOTW represents a different enemy in an unstable political environment. Although political events will shape this emerging battlefield, it also demands that the military adopt an intellectual framework that is not force destruction based. In fact, this new enemy, which ranges from a disaster to a criminal organization, cannot be defeated by applying traditional combat power. Despite this altered mental image of the battlefield, the dangers inherent in misjudging it are the same; namely mission

failure.

The military's ability to do OOTW missions is already shaping its relevance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. As the United States attempts to remain engaged in the world and enlarge its democratic spectrum, doing these missions well is important to national policy. The organization of choice for the modern military to cope in this environment is the Joint Task Force (JTF).

The purpose of this study is to answer the question "is the JTF a learning organization for OOTW?" A respected model for creating learning organization's in the business profession is Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline. In this study, I will outline Senge's model and discuss why it is relevant for learning in the complex OOTW environment. Subsequently, I will determine if JTF doctrine has created the foundation for a learning organization in OOTW? Beyond analyzing JTF doctrine, I will decide whether JTFs, with or in spite of the doctrine, have created benchmarks for success in these operations since the Kurdish Rebellion in February 1991. Do the doctrine and the JTFs themselves exhibit forms of Senge's learning disabilities? If yes, what aspect of the five disciplines is the Army failing to incorporate in its JTF doctrine and organization? The answers to these questions will lead to this final assessment. Does the joint community need to alter its doctrine so as to create a learning organization for future operations?

In undertaking this examination, I will make the following assumptions within my research. First, as previously stated, Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline is an accepted model for constructing and evaluating learning organizations. Second, the JTF will be the organization of choice in the near and distant future to engage in OOTW. Third, each service possesses equally capable corps level organizations to serve as the headquarters

for JTFs in OOTW. Fourth, service rivalry is prevalent in today's post Cold-War military.

Finally, commanders and staff officers develop limited expertise at the operational level and tactical level above the brigade.

My methodology to explain the results of this research is as follows. First, I will introduce Senge's five disciplines and provide a discussion of their relevance to OOTW. Second, I will describe how doctrine forms a JTF for combat in OOTW. In addition, I will identify how this doctrine and others emerging during this period, inhibits or promotes Senge's disciplines and learning disabilities. Third, I will introduce the reader to Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs) in Iraq and Somalia so as to detect the essential learning benchmarks for success. From these case studies, I will identify for the reader, what experience mandates in forming a JTF. Finally, I will analyze Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as the capstone event for this study. This chapter will compare the learning on the ground to the doctrine to figure out if the JTF is a learning organization in OOTW. My conclusions will lay out for the reader the arguments, pro and con, as to whether or not we should alter our current joint doctrine so as to create adaptive JTFs for the future.

## CHAPTER TWO THE FIVE DISCIPLINES

*"Learning in organizations means the continuous testing of experience, and the transformation of that experience into knowledge--accessible to the whole organization, and relevant to its core purpose"<sup>2</sup>*

*Peter Senge*

Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline is a collaborative effort addressing the nature of a learning organization. Most of this work has been through the Center of Organizational Learning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This center, founded in 1991, is a union of scholars, corporations, and businesses large and small with diverse backgrounds and experience. This group, even as I am writing this paper, is struggling to discover how complexity theory and holistic thinking apply to human organizations. Although Senge admits much work is left to be completed, this ongoing work together with this consortium's companions piece, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook, represents foundational work on developing learning organizations.<sup>3</sup> This learning organization model is the foundation on which I will base my research. Senge focuses his material on organizations achieving the disciplines of systems thinking, shared vision, personal mastery, mental models, and team learning so that they can become adaptive, learning organizations in a complex world.

Peter Senge develops an architecture for organizational design based on guiding ideas, theory, methods and tools. These guiding ideas "for learning organizations start

with vision, values, and purpose.”<sup>4</sup> As Senge states, they are “what the organization stands for and what its members seek to create.”<sup>5</sup> Listed in *Table 1* are Senge’s cornerstone elements to guiding ideas, theory, methods and tools.<sup>6</sup>

Guiding Ideas	Theory, Methods, Tools
The primacy of the whole examine the whole, not its pieces.	Use of new ideas, new ways of thinking, then develop the methods and the tools to work with these new ideas.
The community nature of self, honoring the individual, his needs and concerns, and not what he can be used for.	Examine the design and tools of organization.
The generative power of language illuminates the subtle interdependency operating whenever we interact with “reality” and implies a radical shift in how we see some of these changes coming about.	Redesign the structure and resources where people work in order to facilitate learning and vision.

*Table 1*

Soldiers in today’s army have witnessed these elements in the development of Force XXI. For instance, General (Retired) Sullivan and Colonel Dubik comment on this concept of guiding ideas in their article “War in the Information Age”:

Leaders will guide by vision and policy, not by procedure-based rules. Decision making under these conditions will also change. Most decisions will be decentralized. Of those that remain centralized, many will be made in a participative way; fewer will be made by a single leader or manager. Successful corporations will become adaptive, constantly learning and “self renewing” in response to external realities, internal changes and market conditions.

In terms of theory, methods, and tools, individuals can ask themselves just how they have watched Force XXI evolve during the nineties. First, it was a theory in pamphlets, now it has as a field manual to describe its methods, and finally it will have tools through the development of “over the horizon” systems. Senge advises that before leaders build this new organization they should first test their design in “microworld’s” to prove the design’s value.<sup>8</sup> Force XXI is currently proving itself in Battle Labs around the world in the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW) and in exercises like Prairie Warrior at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

These terms are not new to either the army or to organizations in the business world. In fact, treating soldiers with dignity and respect, developing leaders with vision,

testing theories, methods and tools, are inherent values and disciplines for our current military. Certainly, the world did not just decide to get complex. Nevertheless, organizations with guiding ideas, theory, methods, and tools do not thoroughly describe a learning organization. Just what is this animal? Although the beginning of this chapter gives Senge's definition, it still seems mysterious. Three business people, Calvert, Mobley, and Marshall wrestle with this definition in their article "Grasping the Learning Organization." They suggest that the "fundamental characteristic of a learning organization is that it has a systematic approach to collective learning."<sup>9</sup> They propose that although organizations learn, they do so in different ways, with different capabilities, and at different levels both inside and outside of the organization.<sup>10</sup> "To become "learning organizations" organizations must find ways to make learning more intentional and systematic."<sup>11</sup> In other words, a learning organization values the learning process to such an extent, that it creates a system that gets input from anyone and sends output to everyone. Consequently, Senge's learning organization cuts through the hierarchical nature of most organizations. His system for learning is both horizontal and vertical. These lines form a circle, or a whole.

Yet that definition of a holistic approach to learning is still nebulous. Our three business people describe the characteristics of a learning organization. *Table 2* compares their characteristics with two army officers, Harback and Keller.<sup>12</sup>

Calvert, Mobley, and Marshall	Harback and Keller
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learns collaboratively, openly, and across boundaries.</li> <li>• Values how it learns as well as what it learns.</li> <li>• Invests in staying ahead of the learning curve in industry.</li> <li>• Gains a competitive edge by learning faster and smarter than competitors.</li> <li>• Turns data into useful knowledge quickly and at the right time and place.</li> <li>• Enables every employee to feel that every experience provides chance to learn.</li> <li>• Invests in experimental and seemingly tangential learning.</li> <li>• Depoliticizes learning by not penalizing individuals or groups for sharing information and conclusions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leads to collaborative creativity.</li> <li>• Enhances information access through open organization without walls or turfs.</li> <li>• Involves risk taking, delayering, empowerment and allowing learning to come from both failures and successes.</li> <li>• Expands past limits and obtains synergistic results.</li> <li>• Recognizes the universal requirement for real change and reflective thinking.</li> <li>• Emphasizes group growth through the recognition of individual strengths and diversity over weakness</li> <li>• Incorporates 360-degree and double loop feedback's, which enhance dialogue and risk taking.</li> <li>• Allows units to develop the critical element of trust.</li> </ul>

**Table 2**

Their characteristics are remarkably similar. Although all organizations learn, it is the value the organization places on its learning capability that make it a learning one. Can it apply the process across all levels? Is it open, honest, and caring? How does it respond in an uncertain world to adversity and success? In other words, learning organizations have an approach, a way of working within an uncertain world.

Why are organizations like this important to the military? First, the services in the last fifty years have grown accustomed to operating within the Cold War paradigm. This paradigm itself evolved over time, but for to today's modern officer, it has become the analogue for modern battle. However, the Cold War is over, thus the military must adapt to its new environment just like businesses must make adjustments to changes in the marketplace. In the current global strategic paradigm there is only one superpower and several regional "hot buttons" suppressed in the previous paradigm.<sup>13</sup>

Second, the OOTW environment with its wide spectrum of possible activities will force the army in the future to act outside its Cold War model because it no longer has an equal superpower opponent. Our ability to be successful in this environment will not only shape our relevance in these years ahead but also it will help shape our force for the next superpower confrontation. Understanding how to learn and adapt in an uncertain world

will be the vital aspect of this transformation.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, learning organizations leverage all of their resources (human and technological) to adapt in an uncertain environment. They are not fearful of the uncertain world. They relish the challenge of being within it.<sup>15</sup> Forming organizations with this human dimension in an age of downsizing and reduced resources will provide the impetus businesses feel to increase quality while reducing costs.

The focus of this chapter so far has been to describe the learning organization and the reasons to become one. So how does an organization become a learning one? Peter Senge approaches this problem first through recognizing some common learning disabilities within organizations and then applying his five disciplines of a learning organization.

First, let us examine some common learning disabilities listed in *Table 3*. Senge offers these disabilities to help leaders recognize learning problems within their organization.<sup>16</sup>

Learning Disability	Description
I am my position.	Over time, people in organizations develop intense identification with their position—who they are is what they do. This leads to a myopic and non-systemic view of the organization.
The enemy is out there.	With a very narrow sense of self-identification, it becomes natural to think of people outside and around us as enemies.
The illusion of taking charge.	All too often “pro-activeness” means “I’m going to get more active fighting those enemies out there.”
The fixation on events.	We are conditioned to see life as a series of events, and for every event, we think there is one obvious cause.
The parable of the boiled frog.	We are very good at reacting to sudden threats to our survival, but we are very poor at recognizing gradual threats.
The delusion of learning from experience.	The most critical decisions made in organizations have system wide consequences that stretch out over years or decades.
The myth of the management team.	Most teams operate below the level of the lowest IQ in the group. The result is “skilled incompetence”—teams of people who are proficient at keeping themselves from learning.

*Table 3*

Again, I see nothing revolutionary about these disabilities. It is Senge’s view of these disabilities that makes them vital to recognize; each disability affirms a competitive

hierarchical organization that does not learn from its complete environment. In other words, the people in the organization get in the way of their own learning, and consequently do not adapt to a changing world view or paradigm.

So how do people in organizations get out of each other's way and begin to leverage their talents toward solving problems in a complex world? Senge's answer is to master his five disciplines. *Table 4* defines each of them.<sup>17</sup>

Discipline	Description
<b>Building Shared Vision</b>	The practice of unearthing shared "pictures of the future" that foster genuine commitment.
<b>Personal Mastery</b>	The skill of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision
<b>Mental Models</b>	The ability to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to scrutinize them, and to make them open to the influence of others.
<b>Team Learning</b>	The capacity to "think together" which is gained by mastering the practice of dialogue and discussion.
<b>Systems Thinking</b>	The discipline that integrates the others, fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.

**Table 4**

Soldiers need not be apprehensive about this "soft" terminology or dismiss it for its lack of specificity. The first four disciplines are already values that we are comfortable with. Building shared vision is nothing more than a mission statement with intent. Personal Mastery is tactical and technical competence directed toward an end state. Mental models are simply "working outside the box." Team learning is team building but at a higher level. Each of these terms is well within the comfort zone of most soldiers, airman, marines, and sailors.

What is more difficult to grasp is systems thinking or a holistic approach to solving problems. Unfortunately, an organization that does not master systems thinking is just another competent unlearning one.<sup>18</sup> Senge ties the fundamentals of systems thinking to its laws. *Table 5* defines these laws.<sup>19</sup>


Laws of Systems Thinking	Description
Today's problems come from yesterday's "solutions."	Don't do the fix that transfers the problem to another area or time.
The harder you push, the harder the system pushes back.	Sometimes we recognize a problem and use traditional ways to overcome it. When this fails, we often keep applying more pressure rather than trying to understand why the solution isn't working.
Behavior grows better before it grows worse.	A solution feels good and at first cures the symptoms of the problem—but does it really cure the problem in the longer term.
The easy way out usually leads back in.	We all find comfort in applying familiar solutions to problems, but the obvious approach won't always achieve the best results.
The cure can be worse than the disease.	Avoiding work on complex problems, by working on simple ones or shifting the burden.
Faster is slower.	In nature, optimal growth is usually slower than the fastest possible rate of growth.
Cause and effect are not closely related in time and space.	Cause: symptoms that indicate a problem Effect: the interaction of the underlying system that is most responsible for generating symptoms.
Small changes can produce big results—but the areas of highest leverage are often the least obvious.	The key is to understand the structure rather than the event, and the processes of change rather than a snapshot in time.
You can have your cake and eat it too—but not at once	You can have high quality and high profit, but it takes time to swing around customer perceptions.
Dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants.	Living systems have integrity, their character depends on the whole.
There is no blame.	We are they, the cure lies with our relationship with ourselves, not blaming someone else for the cause of our problems.

**Table 5**

The laws of systems thinking, like the learning disabilities, help organizations recognize their hierarchical, fragmented, and disjointed approaches to “fixes” inside and outside their organizations.

Again, although these laws have a distinct business tone to them, they do relate to military organizational designs. For instance, many commanders of units may recognize that they have violated the law of “the cure may be worse than disease” when they consistently find solutions for their subordinate’s problems; consequently, when a crisis occurs, these subordinates cannot think for themselves and thus instead of taking the initiative they wait for instructions.<sup>20</sup> How often have commanders relieved an NCO or junior officer, only to discover later that these individuals were not even part of the problem? This is a violation of the law “the harder you push, the harder the system pushes back.” The roles and mission debate is littered with many of these systems issues. For example, do we need one air force to provide support to all missions, or separate air

forces to support service requirements?<sup>21</sup> This debate is Senge's "If we divide the elephant in half, we do not get two small elephants."



**Figure 1**

Senge's model in *Figure 1* suggests organizations must look beneath the event that they are specifically reacting to and examine not only behaviors associated with this event but also the structural weaknesses that are creating the event.<sup>22</sup> Why is the organization reacting? This model is the heart of the systems approach and will be at the center of examining the JTF's headquarters design.

As stated, four of the five disciplines are all ready inherent in the military mind set. Yet, thinking in holistic or systematic way may not be. My examination of the JTF in the OOTW environment should confirm or deny my hypothesis that the joint community is almost a learning one. Although Senge admits that his systems approach to organizational design is an evolving theory, my examination of the JTF's learning capacity since the Kurdish Rebellion, concludes that his theory offers a model (*Figure 1*) to analyze this organization's adaptive behavior in this new period of military history. In Chapter 3, I will take a hard look at the core JTF doctrine and others that have emerged during this period that play a role in this element's design.

## CHAPTER THREE ELEMENTS OF DESIGN

*A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, Navy or Marine Corps, and the Air Force or two or more of these forces. A force designated as a joint task force (JTF) by appropriate authority. Navy and Marine forces are not a JTF.<sup>23</sup>*

*JP 5-00.2*

This citation is Joint Publication (JP) 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures definition of a JTF. To many in the services this represents a broad and flexible definition, one that gives the National Command Authority (NCA) and its subordinate commanders the ability to address the nation's regional concerns. For others, it leaves the room to label as a JTF anything on up from a company team consisting of a marine platoon and two army ones. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how joint doctrine forms a JTF for combat in OOTW. In addition it seeks to identify how JP 5-00.2 and other emerging doctrine may inhibit or promote Peter Senge's disciplines and disabilities.

Just for a minute imagine, that you, the reader has been tasked to put a JTF headquarters together to respond to a peace operation. Would JP 5-00.2 be the only place you would look? Obviously not. As this paper is being written, joint and service doctrine is moving rapidly not only to respond to the OOTW environment but to define joint operations themselves better.<sup>24</sup> Table 6 lists the major doctrine that is currently

available to the planner for procedural and theoretical guidance in establishing this force.

Doctrinal Manual	Date Published
Joint Publication 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures	September 1991
*Joint Publication 1.0 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces	November 1991
*Field Manual 100-5 Operations	June 1993
*Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations	September 1993
Joint Publication 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces	July 1994
Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations.	December 1994
*Joint Publication 1.0 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces	January 1995
*Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations	February 1995
Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Final Draft)	February 1995
Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations	April 1995

\* Denotes doctrine that was modified in this period

**Table 6**

Table 6 does not claim to be a complete list, but reflects the major emerging doctrine for this analysis. Of note is the release of the JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Handbook). This release only underscores the complexity of JTFs in the OOTW environment. More on the Handbook later in the chapter.

Given this list of doctrine, the first manual to examine for guidance in forming a JTF should be JP 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces. This doctrinal manual provides the overarching direction for achieving joint unity of effort and command. It states the following:

Doctrine establishes joint forces at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. In accordance with the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), combatant commands are established by the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Commanders of unified commands establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS. Joint task forces can be established by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.<sup>25</sup>

When examining this guidance, the NCA is directly involved in the business of forming JTFs. Yet any of three levels described, including an existing JTF Commander, have the authority to form one. The crucial point with this joint publication is that clear lines of authority for constituting one, must flow to the President.

Now that the doctrine has established a chain of command structure, where does it

dictate the development a JTF headquarters? JP 3-0 [Doctrine for Joint Operations](#)

outlines the authority and responsibility given to commanders of JTFs (CJTF):

Commanders of JTFs (CJTFs) are responsible to the JTF establishing authority and exercise OPCON over assigned forces and normally exercise OPCON over attached forces. JTF staffs are normally augmented with representatives from component commands of the establishing headquarters. JTF operations are normally operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives. A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.<sup>36</sup>

JP 3-0 establishes the command and control structure for establishing a JTF. This document outlines the commander's authority over his forces, his staff augmentation, and the level of the warfare in which he is to operate. The word *normally* seems to suggest that the CJTF's staff comes from the component level of command at the operational level. This suggestion indicates that the command should normally be a three star billet, with a requisite staff. Keep in mind that the operative word is *normally*.

Consequently, these two joint doctrinal manuals have prescribed who can configure a JTF headquarters, its chain of command, its authority, and a recommended structural design. Obviously, an officer with the mission for forming a JTF needs more detailed guidance. JP 5-00.2 gets to heart of creating one. This manual's overarching recommendation is to develop a JTF by using a force module building block approach. "Force modules should progress to form a basic command and joint staff element, primarily manned from within the superior commander's headquarters, to elements that require staff augmentation from all components."<sup>27</sup> For example, in our notional crisis, one could use a corps commander and his staff as the command block, then augment this structure with detachments that are specific to the mission, like a PSYOPSs team. The command design would have mission specific communications, logistics, and security

sections to enhance the headquarters' command and control. This approach allows for a great deal flexibility. *Table 7* show this architecture in a more formal manner.<sup>28</sup>

JTF Headquarters Structure	Description
<b>Command and Joint Staff</b>	This element consists of the command section and functional and special staff elements. It may require augmentation from Service component staffs and should consist of an ADVON staff officer designed to precede any JTF headquarters module.
<b>Augmentation Detachments</b>	These units are added to the JTF headquarters to enhance its capability in technical and specialized area. Examples are Civil Affairs, PSYOPS, mortuary affairs.
<b>Communications Support</b>	Communication support may available to the JTF from the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) or other CJSC-controlled communications resources...A deployable WWMCCS terminal with supporting personnel is required for all modules.
<b>Support and Sustainment</b>	Headquarters support includes administrative and logistic support for the JTF headquarters and attached elements. UTCs for all stages of support and sustainment of JTF headquarters should be planned
<b>Security Support</b>	The inclusions of security forces in all JTF headquarters planning is essential. Security elements should modularized to provide compatible support to all JTF elements, depending on threat assessment.

*Table 7*

These five characteristics of the JTF headquarters make up its essential blocks. From these major blocks, mission specific pieces are attached. For this paper, I will examine the first two blocks, command and joint staff section and augmentation detachments. Although the other three blocks are vital to forming a JTF headquarters, its intellectual design is inherent in these two blocks. Finally, when discussing these two blocks keep in mind the difference between an augmentation detachment and a joint augmentee to the staff. The latter is added to enhance the jointness of the headquarters staff and the former is a section with a specific mission to perform in the JTF.

What are the primary command and control functions of this headquarters given these building blocks of its organizational design? *Table 8* lists the primary functions of the commander, his chief of staff, and his staff.<sup>29</sup>

Position	Functions and Responsibilities
<b>Commander</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exercise OPCON over assigned and attached forces, establish succession of command.</li> <li>Organize and reorganize all assigned or attached forces as necessary.</li> <li>Assume responsibility for control of AOR.</li> <li>Develop plans for establishing authority approval.</li> <li>Conduct joint training of forces.</li> <li>Coordinate with non-JTF forces.</li> <li>Keep superiors informed of situation</li> </ul>
<b>Chief of Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure the staff supports commander's decisions, concepts, vision and staff actions worked by proper staff officers.</li> <li>Direct staff operations,</li> <li>Develop staff policies and implement them.</li> <li>Develop liaison with supporting agencies, commands, host nations, US embassies, MAG, Intel agencies, ect</li> </ul>
<b>Collective Staff</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan JTF pre-deployment, deployment, and redeployment.</li> <li>Assist CJTF (Directing, controlling, and coordinating operations of assigned forces. Coordinating the planning activities of subordinate component commands)</li> <li>Develop COAs and conduct staff estimates on COAs</li> <li>Prepare plans and orders based on CJTF decisions concerning COAs.</li> <li>Provide information to supporting or adjacent commands.</li> <li>Coordinate with other forces and agencies not assigned.</li> <li>Coordinate with forces and foreign governments when required by the order establishing the JTF.</li> <li>Monitor progress towards accomplishment of CJTFs decision</li> </ul>

**Table 8**

Of all of these functions and responsibilities, JP 5-00.2 discusses only one in detail, the value of LNOs to JTFs. "Past JTF operations have shown that qualified liaison officers (LNOs) contribute significantly to mission success. CJTF should consider the requirement for LNOs early in the planning process."<sup>30</sup> LNO responsibilities range from establishing the normal higher and lower relationships, to coalition ones, and to the unique ones of the civilian agencies. To work within this large LNO organization, this joint manual suggests forming an LNO committee to coordinate liaison activities. Furthermore, it recommends that LNOs "be knowledgeable about the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services."<sup>31</sup>

JP 5-00.2 defines our notional JTF. It has five pieces. The security, logistics, communication, and command are recognizable sections to most military officers. The augmentation detachments give the JTF headquarters its mission specific expertise. As its name suggests, this staff will enhance the JTF commander's component headquarters. In addition, the CINC will provide augmentees to the staff to upgrade and enhance the

components headquarters' joint expertise. Therefore, the commander must integrate this augmentation section and the augmentees into the staff to create a joint one in order to accomplish the prescribed duties and responsibilities listed in *Table 8*. This "joint" formation is at the heart of why the JTF is such an attractive headquarters to CINCs.

Why? CINCs can assemble and disassemble it rapidly. They can combine service expertise for a limited time to accomplish a limited objective. JP 0-2 describes the reasons to form one:

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area.<sup>32</sup>

In other words, it is a specific organizational structure that is not so large that services must centrally support it or so small that a component command could do the mission itself. Buried inside these reasons is the idea that the JTF can be part of many COAs in a CINCs area of responsibility, without the commander owning the forces until he requires them. More succinctly, the JTF is a CINCs crisis response team.<sup>33</sup>

Experience suggests that the OOTW environment is tailor made for this formation. For the humanitarian assistance operations in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, the JTF has been the organization of choice to respond to these crises. Why? Major Metz explains in his monograph "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma." "Depending on mission requirements, the joint task force's flexible organizational structure permits the attachment of both civilian and military agencies."<sup>34</sup> In short, the JTFs building block approach gives it a unique design feature not inherent in a component command. In each operation listed above, civilian interface, whether it is

governmental or not, becomes the unifying characteristic of these operations. Compare and contrast in *Table 9* the following definitions of the OOTW environment listed in the major doctrine that emerged during this period.

Manual	OOTW Environment
FM 100-5	The OOTW environment is complex. It requires GMK%BOOK versatile troops that can use the level of force required to protect itself while promoting the objective. Although its often the best equipped and suitable force to operate in a particular environment, the idea is not to supersede or diminish the civilian control. In fact, as soon as civil responsibility and action is reestablished, effort should be made to return the environment to local authorities. <sup>35</sup>
FM 100-23	Peace operations are designed principally to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. In peace operations, military action must complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing the overarching political objective. <sup>36</sup>
JP 3-0	Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities. Military operations other than war usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, in a complementary fashion. <sup>37</sup>

*Table 9*

From these doctrinal manuals, the strategic planner and commander should understand that they tie their prescription for success in their AOR directly to their interaction with civilians. What does this civilian dynamic mean to the environment? FM 100-5 states. "Operations in this environment can present a special leadership challenge since the activities of relatively small units can have operational--and even strategic--impact."<sup>38</sup> The CINC's leadership challenge is to unify the military instrument of power with the diplomatic, informational, and economic sources of powers so as to avoid this tactical clash with strategic goals.<sup>39</sup> This unity of effort requires a level of command with links between the strategic and tactical level. Since operational level commands and are service based, the JTF is a tool that can create this unity at the operational level. It has the flexible structure to interface in OOTW.

Given these JTF design features and the loose nature of the doctrine, what are the basic formations for a JTF? The following options for forming a JTF have emerged during this period. First, the CINC may form the headquarters from his own joint staff,

commonly known as deployable JTF. Second, he can use a component commander to form the basis of a joint organization. Third, he can form an entirely "ad hoc" organization from forces within his AOR.<sup>40</sup> As previously stated, the option of choice for CINCs to resolve the vast majority of these humanitarian assistance missions has been the second option.<sup>41</sup> Although this may be the doctrinal recommendation, many of these JTFs did not have a three star component commander and his staff act as the JTF. Two star billets or less commanded JTFs in Kurdistan, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.

The first step in my analysis is to examine if the doctrine promotes any learning disabilities. Of the seven learning disabilities that Senge offers in The Fifth Discipline, the "Myth of the Management Team" is the obvious learning disability to investigate in this design. Why is it obvious? The doctrine encourages the rapid employment of an augmented joint team to solve a crisis. Senge states:

All too often, [crisis response] teams in business tend to spend their time fighting for turf, avoiding anything that will make them look bad personally, and pretending that everyone is behind the team's collective strategy—maintaining the appearance of a cohesive team. To keep up with the image, they squelch disagreement; people with serious reservations avoid stating them publicly, and joint decisions are watered down compromises reflecting what everyone can live with or else reflecting one person's view forced on the group.<sup>42</sup>

The design features that make the JTF useful also create this Senge myth that a composite headquarters can solve the complex problems inherent in OOTW. Major Metz's study of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE suggests that forming a JTF staff with multi-service officers did not make a joint staff. Furthermore, given this lack of jointness combined with their lack of interagency awareness, these staffs were not capable of addressing the scope of their environment. Major Metz points out that although these staffs developed "work arounds," these JTF headquarters did not inherently possess a

flexible and mission specific design.<sup>43</sup>

The Handbook confirms that constructing this joint team is illusive at best and personality based at worst:

It will be necessary to obtain key players for responsible positions from the other Services/components to make your staff representative of the force and fully capable. When forming the staff, the need for experienced personnel possessing a broad view cannot be overemphasized. The staff must be capable of making quick, competent recommendations and decisions. The importance of knowing and being able to rely on key players may require you to handpick some members of your staff (e.g., chief of staff, J-3, etc.). This option is important because personalities often play a significant role on a staff and the commander must be able to reach a comfort level with key staff members.<sup>44</sup>

The doctrine expects that the formation of this staff should be seamlessly joint. However, given the nature of service rivalry and limited time officers serve in operational command and staff positions, the doctrine gives the appearance of addressing a military crisis without addressing these systemic problems the structure itself creates. Staff officers require interservice and interagency training. Chiefs of Staff must create understandable SOPs. Commander's must develop cohesive teams.<sup>45</sup> Although the Handbook reflects this advice, it does not address the systemic problems of forming joint organizations that are not joint.

The doctrine also violates one of Senge's laws of systems thinking, "the harder you push, the harder the system pushes back." JP 5-00.2 provides a system for establishing a JTF, but sidesteps dictating the base component for the headquarters. As already stated, tactical level billets for commands have historically acted as JTFs in the past five years. Consequently, CINCs have formed all kinds of component command organizations with varying degrees of success in OOTW. JTF Somalia is a glaring example of the system creating a structure that pushed back. Compare and contrast in *Table 10* the lessons learned from JTF Somalia to the Handbook design recommendations

to Senge's concept of forming teams.

Author	Design Recommendations
JTF Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The JTF-Somalia was not properly designed or adequately manned.</li> <li>A division headquarters should not serve as the basis for a JTF staff as it does not have the joint service experience or the staff structure for such duty.</li> <li>Joint staff experience or education should be desired of staff augmentees, to include NCO and enlisted augmentees.</li> <li>A "small JTF" performs all of the staff functions that a "large JTF" performs, and must be manned accordingly. Always include key sections in the JTF organizational structure with adequate equipment and vehicle support.</li> <li>Design the JTF headquarters with cross service representation based on METT-T. Doctrinal templates for modular JTF organizations which include all coordinating, special, and personal staff sections, should be developed at the joint staff level. Personnel staffing models for various JTFs should be developed which reflect a range of operations from peace to war.<sup>46</sup></li> </ul>
The Handbook	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The JTF staff is normally formed from an existing headquarters, usually not below the level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Navy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force.<sup>47</sup></li> <li>Get the first team. By definition you will have other Service representation on your staff and in the field--you need the experts with you.</li> <li>Your organization may necessarily be different than a usual warfighting staff, i.e., legal, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs, embassy liaison, and military police will be key players and should be an integral part of your immediate staff.</li> <li>Avoid the difficulties associated with an ad hoc organization--form the JTF headquarters (HQ) around the nucleus of an existing HQ. However, it will be necessary to obtain key players for responsible positions from the other Services/components to make your staff representative of the force and fully capable.<sup>48</sup></li> </ul>
Senge	<p>The fundamental characteristic of the relatively unaligned team is wasted energy. Individuals may work extraordinarily hard, but their efforts do not efficiently translate to team effort. By contrast, when a team becomes more aligned, a commonality of direction emerges and individuals' energies harmonize. There is less wasted energy...There is a commonality of purpose, a shared vision, and understanding of how to complement one another's effort.<sup>49</sup></p>

*Table 10*

Senge warns that an "unaligned team" wastes valuable energy. The lessons learned from Somalia note the inherent design defects of a division JTF. I would describe this tactical team as out of alignment with its operational mission and purpose. Although the Handbook recommends specific levels of command to create this operational alignment, events in Somalia, October 1993, prove that the system can push back hard when one is out of alignment. While the Handbook suggests that the joint community has learned these lessons, the current doctrine does not adequately establish a minimum organizational structure for a JTF. Although FM 100-23 and FM 100-5 comment on the complexity of these operations and the Handbook reflects some of this learning, these are only suggestions to the CINC and commander in OOTW. They are not doctrinal templates for forming JTFs.

Although the doctrine violates a law of systems thinking and has a learning disability, in broad teams it does accomplish Senge's shared vision and address forming "joint" and "OOTW" mental models. *Table 11* compares Senge's approach with these disciplines and current doctrine.

Senge	Doctrine
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>Shared Vision</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•A shared vision, especially one that is intrinsic, uplifts people's aspirations. Work becomes part of pursuing a larger purpose embodied in organizations' products or services--accelerating learning through personal computers, bringing the world into communication through universal telephone service, or promoting freedom of movement through personal automobile. The larger purpose can also be embodied in the style, climate, and spirit of the organization.<sup>50</sup></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>JP 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•A clearly understood aim (commander's intent) enables subordinates to exercise initiative and flexibility while pursuing the commander's goals and priorities. Joint force commanders should scrupulously avoid overly detailed management and direction. Simple orders with the intent of the commander clearly articulated comprise the best basis for clear and effective communications between and among all elements of the joint force.<sup>51</sup></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>Mental Models</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•The problems with mental models lie not in whether they are right or wrong--by definition, all models are simplifications. The problem with mental models arise when the model are tacit--when they exist below the level of awareness.<sup>52</sup></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<b>JP 0.2 Unified Action Armed Forces</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Unified action integrates joint, single-Service, special, and supporting operations, in conjunction with interagency, non-governmental, private voluntary organizations, multinational, or United Nations operations, into a unity of effort in the theater or joint operations area. Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.<sup>53</sup></li> </ul> </li> </ul>

*Table 11*

JP 1-0 lays the ground work for shared vision in a joint force. It points out the power that a clear understanding of the commander's intent brings, unity of effort, initiative, and direction to an organization. In Senge's terms intent creates purpose, climate, and spirit within an organization. Although, JP 0-2 cannot mandate this scope of awareness in a joint climate, it establishes the fundamental mental model that joint commander's can expect to operate. Clearly, this idea of unified action is out of the "Cold War" box and in the new joint military-civilian environment. As I stated, in Chapter 2, proficiency in some disciplines does not make an adaptive learning organization.

In this chapter, I have analyzed current doctrine as to how to form a JTF for combat in OOTW. I then compared this formation to Senge's The Fifth Discipline to uncover any design flaws. My essential conclusion is that the doctrine has a structural design defect. This flaw, in Senge's terms, generates the patterns of behavior that create

the events to which organizations end up responding. These reactions in an unlearning organization, prevent it from completely understanding its environment. The fundamental design shortcoming is the size of command expected to act at the operational level. The nonspecific nature of the doctrine and its presumption of joint expertise will more than likely create an organization that will have difficulty adapting in OOTW. The following chapter will seek to uncover the essential learning benchmarks from cases in the real world. I will examine JTF Operations in Northern Iraq and Somalia to discover what critical learning occurred in these case studies within the JTF. In Chapter 5, I will test these benchmarks to decide if the JTFs in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY learned from experiences and/or exhibited signs of this identified doctrinal design flaw.

## CHAPTER FOUR BENCHMARKS FOR SUCCESS

*Not all services treat the Chief of Staff the same, for example, the Marine Corps and the Army consider the Chief of Staff the driving force in the headquarters. However, the Chief of Staff is considered just another staff officer in the Air Force and the Navy. Do not assume that multinational or jointly developed staffs understand the unique relationships between staffs. Educate newly developed staffs upon their arrival. Determine unique differences in joint C<sup>2</sup> problems and their solutions.<sup>54</sup>*

*CALL Newsletter 92-6*

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs) and define the learning benchmarks that have occurred within them between 1991 and 1994. I will describe the background for these HAOs and their JTF command structure. Finally, I will compare their lessons learned within the joint command and staff section and the augmentee detachments to detect these learning benchmarks. To those conducting similar research, my lessons learned are drawn from the Center for Army Lessons Learned publications and may thus unintentionally have an Army bias.

Just what is a humanitarian assistance operation? Current doctrine in the joint and service community is struggling with the answer to this question. Again, lets us examine in *Table 12*, the current definition in the major doctrinal manuals to discover a unifying one.

Manual	Definition of HAO
FM 100-5	Humanitarian assistance (HA) is not included in the definition of peace operations; however HA programs will probably be conducted simultaneously in almost every peace operation. Normally limited in their scope and duration, HA projects have a significant impact on resources required and other aspects of peace operations. HA programs will often take place following Peace Enforcement. HA includes programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of complex emergencies involving natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that may result in great damage or loss of property. HA supplements or complements the efforts of a host nation, civil authorities, or agencies that may have primary responsibility for HA. <sup>55</sup>
FM 100-23	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HA are normally be conducted by a joint task force and in concert with non-government organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). HA tasks include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ Distribution of relief supplies.</li> <li>⇒ Transportation of relief supplies and civilians.</li> <li>⇒ Provision of health services.</li> <li>⇒ Provision of essential services.</li> <li>⇒ Resettlement of dislocated civilians.</li> <li>⇒ Disposition of human remains.</li> <li>⇒ Establishment of essential facilities</li> </ul> </li> <li>• NGOs and PVOs have the ability to respond quickly and effectively to disaster relief, food distribution needs, and programs aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty and vulnerability to disaster. While continuing to be responsive to immediate human needs, particularly in emergency situations, NGOs and PVOs increasingly contribute to long term development activities crucial to improving conditions in the developing world.<sup>56</sup></li> </ul>
JP 3-0	Humanitarian assistance operations fall under the umbrella of civil-military operations. They include disaster relief, support to displaced persons as well as humanitarian and civic assistance. Included in support to civil authorities are US domestic actions applicable to disaster-related civil emergencies and civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included in assistance for civil disturbances are military support to US domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of life and federal property, and prevention of disruptions to federal functions. <sup>57</sup>

**Table 12**

Like the definition of OOTW in Chapter 3, the unifying characteristic of HAO is the integration of military mission with that of the civilian agencies' to execute the assistance effort.

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE are highly dissimilar missions. One occurred in European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, the other Central Command's (CENTCOM). One formed an "ad hoc" JTF structure, the other a component command headquarters. One occurred while the nation mobilized for war, the other in a drawdown. One occurred while JTF doctrine was in its infancy, the other while it was emerging. The operations also had some common elements. Both had two distinct phases. Both deployed into hostile AORs to do an HAO and were coalition efforts. Finally, they are symmetric as to time. PROVIDE COMFORT marks the beginning of a new HAOs period in the single superpower world, and the other marks the middle. They

are my laboratories to analyze the learning that occurred between them to find any benchmarks for mission success in HAOs, and possibly any OOTW mission.

The Kurdish Rebellion in Northern Iraq was in part post conflict and part humanitarian assistance operation. In February 1991, as the coalition forces were defeating the Iraqi Army, the Kurdish tribe attempted to regain some of their sovereignty from Iraq. President Bush's pre-STORM statements suggested to the Kurds that the US would support actions to overthrow or destabilize the Saddam Hussein Regime.<sup>58</sup> The Iraqi leader's response to this uprising led President Bush to offer assistance to the Kurds, who were struggling to survive in the mountains of Iraq and unable to gain access to Turkey. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had two phases. Phase I supplied these refugees with survival materials. Phase II expanded the operation to resettle this population, first in camps in the mountain plains and then in their towns in Iraq.<sup>59</sup> CINC, European Command (EUCOM) formed JTF Proven Force, primarily an air force command, to conduct relief efforts during Phase I. For Phase II in April, the CINC directed the Deputy CINC of US Army to stand up Combined Task Force (CTF). Lieutenant General Shalikashvili formed two JTFs, Alpha and Bravo. JTF Alpha, special and civil affair forces, worked primarily with the refugees in the mountains. JTF Bravo, combat, civil, and engineer forces constructed and secured the resettlement areas in Iraq.<sup>60</sup>

In January 1991, the last formal elements of Somali government collapsed. This disintegration produced anarchy and an artificial famine in the country. Although the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental agencies were conducting peacekeeping and relief missions in Somalia, the warring factions in late 1992 caused most of these agencies to evacuate the country. Additionally, they undermined the credibility of the UN's

peacekeeping force. President Bush in late November decided with UN support to aid the starving Somali population.<sup>61</sup> Operation RESTORE HOPE lasted sixteen months and was divided in two phases. For both phases, Central Command (CENTCOM) formed JTF Somalia from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light). Phase I, primarily a US operation, was an HAO that restored security for relief efforts. Phase II, primarily a UN peacekeeping operation, maintained a cease fire between the warring clans.<sup>62</sup>

The focus of the criteria in *Table 13* is the two essential building block design elements described in JP 5-00.2. The CMOC is not a design feature of JP 5-00.2, but appeared in enough of the lessons learned to add it as a section for evaluation, separate from civil affairs.

Command and Staff Lessons	Augmentation Detachment Lessons
<b>Augmentees:</b> LLs from officers and NCOs assigned or attached to the JTF from other services to enhance its "jointness."	<b>Civil Affairs(CA):</b> LLs from civil affairs operations.
<b>LNOs:</b> LLs from officers and NCOs assigned or attached to liaison with all aspect of the JTF mission requirements.	<b>Psychological Operations(PSYOPS):</b> LLs from PSYOPS operations.
<b>Size and Composition</b> LLs from the JTF core capabilities bases upon unit size and service composition.	<b>Civil-Military Operations Cell(CMOC):</b> LLs from the interface of this cell and NGOs and PVOs.

*Table 13*

*Table 14* lists the lessons learned by criteria and HAO.<sup>63</sup>

	<b>PROVIDE COMFORT</b>	<b>RESTORE HOPE</b>
<b>Augmentees</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assign replacements to be the deputy for a period of time.</li> <li>Have each staff establish a continuity file and review this weekly.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The issue is how to best staff or augment a JTF headquarters with personnel who have the training, experience, and capabilities necessary to plan and execute Joint operations.</li> <li>Augmentations must contain legitimate experts capable of immediately articulating the needs of their service, as well as technical experts from low density functional specialties.</li> </ul>
<b>LNOs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Language qualifications are important, but not as doctrinal or tactical knowledge.</li> <li>LNOs should be positioned in both higher and subordinate headquarters to ensure coordination and rapid passing of vital information.</li> <li>Joint headquarters should include NGO/PVO liaison as an adjunct to host-nation support functions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LNO requirements are huge and immediate.</li> <li>Teams must be available, trained, and equipped for immediate deployment.</li> <li>Success in operation due in part to effective LNO at all levels.</li> </ul>
<b>Size and Composition</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>During Operation Provide Comfort, the JTFs were not allowed to deploy complete staffs. Allowing the complete staff to deploy would have facilitated better initial assessments, and reduced the training time required of new personnel that had not previously worked together</li> <li>Deploy with complete staffs, if reduction is necessary, reduce the staff only after the transition to Phase 2.</li> <li>There is simply no time to train new staffs without the risk of increasing hardships of the personnel you are there to help.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A division headquarters should not serve as the basis for a JTF staff as it does not have the joint service experience or the staff structure for such duty.</li> <li>Headquarters with staffs which have worked together operate efficiently, having developed habitual relationships and assimilated common planning experience during training.</li> <li>Standing JTFs from CINC staffs have this capability. Corps headquarters can be used, but be careful how augmentees are utilized in the staff</li> </ul>
<b>CA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HAOs are CA missions.</li> <li>CA assets were not given requisite priority during deployment.</li> <li>Include CA personnel in planning process, preferably FA 39 officers to S5, G5 shops. They should handle CA planning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Civil Affairs was vital to operation, particularly with no host nation structure</li> <li>CA units and personnel requirements were inadequately resourced. If a fully-staffed battalion had been employed, C-M cooperation would have been significantly enhanced.</li> </ul>
<b>PSYOPs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The corps must ensure continuity with strategic and operational PSYOP being conducted at echelons above corps.</li> <li>Augmentation of the PSYOP battalion by indigenous writers, announcers, illustrators, and interpreters will enhance operational effectiveness of the unit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PSYOPs teams must understand the parameters approved for the conduct of psychological operations and must coordinate the efforts with governmental and non governmental agencies involved in similar objectives.</li> </ul>
<b>CMOC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expect some hesitancy and resentment or just plan benevolence from relief agencies in AOR.</li> <li>Develop both a refugee operations doctrine and operations methodology publication. Ensure doctrine focuses on cooperation with NGOs and UN and transfer of control to these organizations.</li> <li>Recognize that coordination and integration of NGO will not be easy.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CAO from UN Logistic Support Command provided support, and was JTFs only official contact with NGOs and local national officials.</li> <li>Military interface in Humanitarian Center of UNOSOM proved critical in coordinating and explaining military policies and supporting relief efforts through UNOSOM and at times directly through relief agencies</li> <li>CMOC of the JTF was the interface between UN and NGOs.</li> </ul>

**Table 14**

What were the essential benchmarks to form an effective joint command and staff section? First, each operation mandated that trained joint personnel were essential to mission success. Augmenting the staff with untrained personnel inhibited the JTF getting in the assistance to the population that needed it. Second, competent LNOs that can operate within the full range of the mission requirements, (coalition forces, NGOs/PVOs, civil authorities, etc.) were equally essential to developing, translating, and executing a

“shared vision” in the HAO environment. Third, the headquarter's size and composition must be large enough and staffed enough to support the operational and strategic goals it was in the AOR to execute.

What were the essential benchmarks for success in augmentation sdetachments? The civil affairs section must be incorporated immediately into every phase of the operation and must large enough so that their assets can support the entire scope of the mission. The commitment of large PSYOPs section was also vital to the operation. The section must not only have a tactical and operational awareness, but also a strategic one, so that it does not conflict with the strategic goals. Additionally, the PSYOPs section must quickly develop a local flavor to their team to enhance the operation's credibility. Finally, the CINC must staff the augmentation section with personnel that understand the capabilities, requirements, and missions of the many civilian agencies operating in the environment. This included the formation of a CMOC, which was both a trusted interface with civilian agencies and a pipeline for vital information to the commander. Inadequately staffing or committing an untrained section can have dire consequences to mission success. The CMOC became JTF Somalia's only internal link to the NGOs in its AOR. It is important that the CMOC not be just a large CA section. It must take on the same characteristics of any operations cell in a military unit, one that a CINC staffs to oversee the entire AOR, just not its area of expertise. The JTF commander will have difficulty gaining a true situational awareness without an understanding and appreciation of these sections.

Two years separated these two operations from Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Plenty of time for the joint community, the services, and the CINCs to

draw lessons from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE. Experience shows then that joint expertise, LNOs, operational level commands, robust CA, PSYOPS, and CMOC detachments are the some of the benchmarks for adapting in this environment. How far off then is emerging joint and service doctrine in articulating these benchmarks? Will CINCs again make the mistake of deploying units into an AOR without addressing these benchmarks or are JTFs destined to repeat the learning that occurred in this period? Chapter 5 holds the answers to these questions as we explore Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

## CHAPTER FIVE UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

*The neglected leadership role is the designer of the ship. No one has a more sweeping influence than the designer.<sup>64</sup>*

*Peter Senge*


The focus of this chapter is to combine the analysis of the JTF design flaw uncovered in Chapter 3 and the real world benchmarks for success discovered in Chapter 4. I will use the military's most recent HAO, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY to conduct this analysis. The reader can find the answer to two fundamental questions at the end of this chapter. Has JTF doctrine promoted or inhibited learning in the OOTW environment? More important, is the JTF a learning organization in it?

The first issue I need to address in comparing this operation with the previous ones discussed, is to ask if Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is an HAO? The planning for this operation did not start that way. Anyone watching the events unfold in Haiti and in the United States on national television on seventeen and eighteen September 1994, would agree that the military's deployment into Haiti was going to be a combat operation to overthrow Cedra's military grip on the nation. Yet, at the last minute, the Carter Delegation, consisting of this ex-President, retired General Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn, established conditions for a peaceful deployment into Haiti.<sup>65</sup> Although one can argue whether reestablishing the conditions for democracy is an HAO, it was not

peacekeeping or a peace enforcement mission in strictest sense either. Most of the tasks performed after the tactical ground units secured the AOR resemble the list of missions outlined for HAOs in JP 3-0 and listed in *Table 12*. Furthermore, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, despite its definition, is an ongoing operation in which to evaluate our doctrine and my benchmarks for success.

CINC, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) formed two JTFs. The CINC stood up JTF 180 from the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps and JTF 190 from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Infantry Division (Light). Since USACOM was initially planning for combat operations in two phases, first forced entry and then security and assistance, these JTFs went through a more deliberate planning process than a crisis action one. Crisis action planning for previous HAOs had been norm for JTFs. Consequently, the CINC for USACOM decided to have the JTFs also act as the ARFOR headquarters for this operation. He based his decision upon that UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was an army mission.<sup>66</sup>

*Figure 2* illustrates the doctrine that emerged or was emerging and the lessons learned from previous HAOs available to the USACOM and the JTFs.



*Figure 2*

Although UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initially a combat operation, these commanders and their staffs had significant experience and material to draw from for designing the structure and manning the JTFs. Much of the doctrine published after the invasion, was in

final draft form before it. In addition, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), along with the Joint Unified Lessons Learned System (JULLS) published documents reflecting lessons learned on the time line, except Operation SUPPORT HOPE. I can estimate that up to this point in time, the command and staff planning Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had unparalleled time and resources to develop a learning JTF headquarters. Therefore, I find it interesting that the same unit that learned many valuable lessons with respect to having a division as a JTF was JTF 190.

*Table 15* will analyze the lessons learned against the benchmarks for success developed in Chapter 4.<sup>67</sup> In addition, I will incorporate the lessons learned from the Handbook to represent the most current doctrine in order to evaluate the doctrinal response to this period:

	<b>UPHOLD DEMOCRACY</b>	<b><u>HANDBOOK</u></b>
<b>Augmentees</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The [JTF 190] J5 was composed almost entirely of augmentees. A staff section composed completely of augmentees enters into the operation behind the power curve- section will not understand SOP of the core unit.</li> <li>JTF 180 JMC augmentees were not properly trained in joint staff procedures. It is unrealistic to expect personnel from the different services to hit the ground running without some sort of start up training.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It will be necessary to obtain key players for responsible positions from the other Services/ components to make your staff representative of the force and fully capable.</li> <li>When forming the staff, the need for experienced personnel possessing a broad view cannot be overemphasized.</li> <li>The staff must be capable of making quick, competent recommendations and decisions.</li> </ul>
<b>LNOs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None Stated</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maximum use of liaison officers also will enhance interoperability and unity of effort.</li> <li>At the earliest opportunity, identify the requirement for liaison personnel, linguists, and foreign area specialists to the supported combatant commander.</li> <li>It is essential that liaison personnel have equipment compatible with the JTF.</li> </ul>
<b>Size and Composition</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While a the contingency corps routinely trains as JTF, the Army divisions does not. Army doctrine does not address the division as a JTF headquarters, and there was TTP or SOP that adequately described to signal planners what the J6 and JCCC of the Army divisions should consist of, or how it should function.</li> <li>JTF must decide what joint boards and centers are required, and which staff section will supervise these boards and centers. The JTF must decide whether to form component headquarters (ARFOR, MARFOR, NAVFOR, AFFOR) or subordinate JTFs (JSOTF, JPOTF, JCATF) and then ensure that the responsibilities are fully defined.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The JTF staff is normally formed from an existing headquarters, usually not below the level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Navy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force.</li> <li>The importance of knowing and being able to rely on key players may require you to hand pick some members of your staff (e.g., chief of staff, J-3, etc.). This option is important because personalities often play a significant role on a staff and the commander must be able to reach a comfort level with key staff members.</li> </ul>
<b>CA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Non-qualified CA soldiers deployed to Haiti</li> <li>The Senior CMA officer needs to be separated from the J3/G3. Eliminate the bureaucratic layers in HAOs. The CMO is vital to the operation and should not be subordinate to the J3/G3, make him the J9 or G9.</li> <li>CA personnel need training on how to work with NGOs and POVs.</li> <li>US forces must have an understanding of how these organizations work in order to anticipate how they will affect military operations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial situation assessment by the civil-military operations staff officer is crucial to the proper staffing of the CA supporting element.</li> <li>Civil-military operations should be integrated into your overall mission execution plan.</li> <li>Information gathered by CA personnel from various civilian entities greatly enhances the overall intelligence effort.</li> <li>CA, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations should strive to work closely together.</li> </ul>
<b>PSYOPS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early integration of PSYOP into JTF planning and operations and establishment of JPSYOP task force contributed significantly to success of operation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure you have and exercise approval authority over PSYOP products, activities, and programs. Coordination between PAO, CA, NGOs, PVOs, political advisor, and PSYOP is imperative.</li> </ul>
<b>CMOC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communications between CMOC and NGOs and PVOs was not planned for or coordinated. Interoperability with military and civilian communication equipment was difficult and multiplied by the language barriers.</li> <li>A Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center was established away from the military centers, but still under control of CMOC to facilitate coordination between these elements and the military.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The successful commander integrates civilian organizations, political representatives, and the military into the staff (planning process). In Somalia, a CMOC was established and proved to be a great success. It provided a forum for all sides to be heard.</li> <li>Personnel from NGOs and PVOs can provide the civilian representation. As discussed in other sections of this handbook, these organizations can provide expertise in alleviating human suffering.</li> </ul>

***Table 15***

Has JTF doctrine promoted or inhibited learning in the OOTW environment? If one can make the assumption that the Handbook's lessons learned will appear in more

authoritative documents, such as JP 3-0 and JP 5-00.2, then the answer is yes. From each of benchmarks established in Chapter 4, the Handbook incorporates the lessons learned in the last five years. Yet, if one takes a Senge view of the structural design discovered in Chapter 3, then the answer is no. This is particularly the case, when one examines the same lessons repeatedly with the joint command and staff section.

Across the board in these operations, joint expertise and component command staff size continue to be troubling issues for JTF headquarters. More disappointing, when one takes a Senge view of the “myth of the management team,” the joint community has not addressed this issue. A JTFs minimum size should not be anything less than a corps level headquarters. Officers assigned to the JTF headquarters to augment its joint expertise must have joint expertise. FMs 100-5, FM 100-23, and JP 3-0, make recommendations to CINCs reference this complex environment and the requirement for joint expertise, but do not give him any authoritative guidance on structural size. The authoritative guidance must come from JP 5-00.2. Despite JPs 1-0 and 3-0 going through two revisions in this period of analysis, JP 5-00.2’s flimsy guidance on the minimum JTF requirements has not changed. This Senge structural design flaw as stated in Chapter 3, is at the root of the systemic problems that keep an organization from learning and adapting in its environment. CINC, USACOM decision to form JTF 190 from a division headquarters led to assigning unqualified joint officers to its staff. It confirms a clear disregard for the fundamental learning experienced during this period and a doctrinal desire to fix it. Consequently, despite the tremendous learning that has appeared in emerging doctrine, it has not created a learning organization.

Is the JTF a learning organization in OOTW? I stated at the end of Chapter 2 that

the military is already practicing four of Senge's five disciplines. Despite the noted structural design flaw, the evidence bears out this assessment. JTF Somalia overcame many complex issues by developing a staff that created "work arounds" for difficult problems. Their integration of a CMOC, NGOs, PVOs, and LNOs proves a strong sense of **team learning**. These concepts have found their way into recent doctrine and are being practiced in Haiti. In addition, the armed services since Operation PROVIDE COMFORT have been breaking down **mental models** for working with and solving problems with NGOs, PVOs, and other agencies. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY to date, is the consummate example of the military's capability to function effectively within the constraints imposed by the interagency environment. Furthermore, the armed services are conducting training to increase joint expertise and to break down service mental models at service staff colleges and joint schools.<sup>68</sup> This capacity displays a willingness to work "outside the box" of normal military problems.

Perhaps the greatest work around in this environment is the ability of the military to develop a sense of **shared vision** and a **personal mastery**. In other words, despite the JTFs poor structural design, these commanders and the service members they led, ultimately accomplished their humanitarian missions in an extremely complex environment. As Metz states in his analysis of JTF Command and Control, "The successes of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE, demonstrate the agility and flexibility US forces bring to HAOs."<sup>69</sup> These are Senge characteristics for organizations that have a shared vision and a personal mastery surrounding that vision.

Yet, the JTF is not a learning organization. Senge would describe an organization that consistently overcomes its structural design flaws as one that is waiting for the

big push back. A CINC would not dare use a division headquarters to act as his operational level of command in a combat AOR. It is akin to having a brigade act as the division's headquarters in a division sector or zone. Continuing to allow this structure to operate in OOTW without major joint modifications to its organization and training, is simply skirting disaster. I cannot say it more emphatically than this CALL RESTORE HOPE passage:

The joint community must commit to a thorough analysis of how best to form, train, and deploy a JTF headquarters. Essential to any JTF model are fully qualified personnel with joint experience. The issue is how best to staff or augment a JTF headquarters with personnel who have the training, experience, and capabilities necessary to plan and execute joint operations. Augmentations must contain legitimate experts capable of immediately articulating the needs of their service, as well as technical experts from low density functional specialties. Headquarters with staffs which have worked together operate efficiently, having developed habitual relationships and assimilated common planning experience during training. Standing JTFs from CINC staffs have this capability. Corps headquarters can be used, but be careful how augmentees are utilized in the staff.<sup>70</sup>

Until the joint community commits itself to this level of analysis, JTF headquarters will continue to as Major Metz states, "waste valuable time as they form and become operational."<sup>71</sup> Time may not always be available. Time in a HAO can cost the lives of the very people that such operations are supposed to be helping or can endanger the lives of the service members on the ground, air, and sea.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSIONS

*The first principle in joint force organization is that Joint Force Commanders organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of the operation. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint Force Commanders may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.<sup>72</sup>*

*General (Retired) Colin L. Powell*

In the past five chapters, I have investigated the following issues. First, does JTF doctrine create a learning organization? Second, did the doctrine that emerged during the five-year period being examined enhance this organizational design? Third, did JTFs learn in OOTW environments in Iraq and Somalia? Fourth, did doctrine and lessons learned promote the creation of a learning JTF in Haiti? Finally, is the JTF a learning organization?

In Chapter 2, I established the relevance of Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline to OOTW and organizational design. I introduced the components of guiding ideas, theory, methods, tools, the five disciplines, learning disabilities, and the laws of systems thinking. The most important component of this discussion was Senge's theory of systems design.

*Figure 1* in Chapter 2 is a model of how an organization's structure can end up shaping how an organization understands its environment. In other words, the structure can create a false reality for the organization. This model is particularly relevant to the military's new paradigm for action in a single superpower world.

In Chapter 3, I examined the major doctrine that creates a joint organization. JP 5-

00.2 addressed this design at the JTF level. Yet JPs 0-2, 1-0, 3-0 produce the theoretical foundation for the jointness of this organization. In addition, Army FMs 100-5 and 100-23 help shape the environment in OOTW. I then contrasted the doctrinal shape of a JTF headquarters to Senge's five disciplines. Although I discussed the five building blocks of this headquarters, I argued that we derive the heart of the organization from its joint command and staff section and augmentation detachments. These are the sections that doctrinally give it the required flexibility to respond to a crisis. My essential finding from this discussion was that JTF doctrine resulted in two major system design flaws. First, crisis management teams rarely solve complex problems, and second, structural inadequacies which created another set of organizational crises in the OOTW environment.

In Chapter 4, I examined two major HAOs to detect what were the essential learning experiences the JTF headquarters had derived from the real world. I then compared and contrasted the lessons learned by the headquarters command and staff section and augmentation detachments from Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE. From these observations, I labeled critical lessons learned as benchmarks for success in OOTW. In the command and staff section I classed augmentees, LNOs, and composition as significant to mission success. In the augmentation detachments, I discovered that the PSYOPs, Civil Affairs, CMOC sections were also vital. From these benchmarks, I found that the JTF headquarters had learned a great deal from its environment. The upshot of this learning however would reveal itself in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Consequently, Chapter 5 compared these learning benchmarks from Operations

PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE both to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and The JTFs Commander's Handbook in Peace Operations, so as to answer the fundamental question of this paper; namely is the JTF a learning organization in OOTW? My finding was that the JTF is not a learning organization in OOTW because it cannot overcome the structural design flaw uncovered in Chapter 3. Despite joint and service doctrine's effort to increase the capability of their organizations in the OOTW environment, this doctrine has not corrected the structural flaw of the JTF; specifically, two star level billets and their staffs are ill-equipped to function in the operational and strategic environment; and augmenting these staffs with joint billets so as to enhance their operational capability does just the opposite for a period, until the headquarters can develop sufficient work arounds.

Therefore, the principal findings of my research are the following: First, Peter Senge's disciplines to organizational learning are valuable to evaluating military design structure because of his holistic approach to developing organizations. Senge's approach is not a radical departure from what the military currently practices. Systems thinking causes leaders to look at every aspect of their organization's environment. This holistic approach is extremely useful in identifying paradigm change and structural design flaws. Second, JTF doctrine has responded to OOTW, but such doctrine has not established a structure that learns in this environment. Third, JTFs have learned from experiences including adjusting for the organizational design flaw that I have revealed, but these are only "work arounds." Structural improvement rests with the CINCs and the JCS.

Consequently, what doctrinal or organizational changes need to be made in order to create a learning JTF in OOTW? I essentially have four. First, increase the number of

OOTW joint exercises at the operational level and decrease the number of cold war paradigm exercises so as to reflect our new environment. Second, create robust CINC staffs that can rotate from CINC responsibilities to JTFs ones. Third, significantly alter corps and division organizational design to imitate the joint nature of a CINC headquarters. Finally, dissolve corps like headquarters in all services and form standing JTFs that resemble CINC headquarters.

The first three recommendations are not radical departures from what the services and CINCs are already doing. The joint community and the services are not only committed to developing a unified approach to training joint officers to serve at the operational level, but also are supporting joint training mechanisms and situational exercises to improve the expertise of these commanders and staffs.<sup>73</sup> Although simulations like Prairie Warrior continue to focus leaders, doctrine, and training on major operational land warfare, at the same time we are developing other ones to reflect this new OOTW paradigm.<sup>74</sup> Some CINCs already have deployable JTFs within their headquarters, increasing their organizational size is nothing new.<sup>75</sup> In addition, increasing the jointness of division and corps staff is not a radical departure from our current design. In other words, all of these recommendations serve to preserve the essential components of the Cold War command structure. I would like to advance in the final pages of this monograph a more radical approach to design.

We have many structures and ideas left over from the Cold War paradigm that we can explore at the macro level so as to resolve our organizational design dilemma in the single superpower world. One major structure that deserves an investigation is the corps staff and the ones like it in the other services. Are they still needed or can we replace

them with a more “leveraging” organization? As argued throughout this paper, our current doctrine and lessons learned in the past five years support the notion that a joint three star level billet and staff are the proven organizational platform to consolidate service resources, learn faster, and ultimately leverage more combat power at the operational level.<sup>76</sup> So why not permanently create this organization?

This idea forces the military to put its combat power into the same peacetime organizations that they are currently creating to handle OOTW. Having the JTF as the parent organization for divisions, wings, MEFs, and fleets simplifies and unifies their combat resources. Unifying effort and command and simplifying military actions are the theoretical foundation for most orders and plans. Yet, as explained in this monograph, our doctrine and our practice contradict these fundamental principles of our theory.

The replacement of corps and comparable staff organizations with permanent JTFs would streamline structure and increase vital resources and savings for future service investment. The savings generated or lost in each of these cases are within each service’s budget to use or lose. The “jointness” of a JTF headquarters could provide the cost savings for future investment and training and would thereby ultimately increase the combat power of the total force.

More important than cost savings or theory is the need to create an organization that can learn and adapt in peace and in war. Each time we form a JTF for a contingency it is an entirely new organization. It is true that each of these organizations has, for the most part, enjoyed success; however, since they are dissolved and returned to the control of their service headquarters, any learning has generally been left on the “lessons learned” shelves. The consequences of this lack of institutional learning is not only repetition of

past mistakes, but also a failure to create an ongoing vision for these organizations to grow, adapt, develop in peacetime. In addition, we destroy technical proficiency, sense of a team, and SOPs, only for us to have to renew these assets in the face of hostilities. Although JTF commanders and staffs do develop the “work arounds” to function in these crises, such “work arounds” are not the optimal solution.

Would building permanent JTFs destroy the flexible design that makes them useful? Although fixed organizations can be inflexible, CINC headquarters do not manifest this phenomena in my opinion because they are inherently joint. Joint doctrine recommends establishing operational commands as JTF headquarters; however, CINCs do not follow this guidance and thereby limit their flexibility in a AOR.. Finally, CINCs who establish three star billets as JTF commands still do not resolve the inadequate “work around” process that JTFs experience. In short, in order to create flexibility, the joint community should form a permanent structure that is capable of adaptation instead of an “ad hoc” one.

In conclusion, building a standing JTF to replace the corps organization dramatically reshapes and reorganizes today’s force. This new organization is theoretically sound because it simplifies and unifies the effort while maintaining proficiency in peace. In addition, gutting the services of redundant staff functions and equipment could create a windfall of assets that we could better use for modernization and training. In other words, use these assets to build better outfitted and technically proficient units to engage in OOTW and other regional contingencies. Finally, it would create a learning environment, one that not only would do much to end needless service rivalry and obsolete mental models but also would leverage available assets to address the nation's

interest in any region of the world.

## Endnotes

1. Colin Powell, "A Joint Doctrinal Statement" (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 22.
2. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 49.
3. Ibid. p. xvi. I paraphrased this summary of Senge's work at MIT.
4. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), p. 23.
5. Ibid., p. 23.
6. Ibid., pp. 23-35. I developed table from a series of quotations on guiding ideas, theory, method, and tools.
7. Gordon R. Sullivan, and Dubik, "War in the Information Age," in Envisioning Future Warfare, ed. Gordon R. Sullivan, and Dubik (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command General Staff College Press, 1995), p. 49.
8. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), pp. 32-35. Microworlds are an essential aspect of Senge's concept of testing theoretical structure before implementing the design. I drew this analogy to Force XXI from my own experience at the Command and General Staff College.
9. Gene Calvert, Sandra Mobley, and Lisa Marshall, "Grasping the Learning Organization," *Training and Development* (June 1994), p. 40.
10. Ibid., p. 40.
11. Ibid., p. 40.
12. Gene Calvert, Sandra Mobley, and Lisa Marshall, "Grasping the Learning Organization," *Training and Development* (June 1994) p. 41; Herbert F. Harback, and Ulrich H. Keller, "Learning Leader XXI," *Military Review*, no. May-June (1995):31-37, p. 34. I constructed this table from tables the authors provided. I edited those characteristics that I thought were similar, while maintaining the actual character of each author's own table.
13. Gene Calvert, Sandra Mobley, and Lisa Marshall, "Grasping the Learning Organization," *Training and Development* (June 1994), p. 41; Herbert F. Harback, and Ulrich H. Keller, "Learning Leader XXI," *Military Review*, no. May-June (1995):31-37, p. 34; Gordon R. Sullivan, "Ulysses S. Grant and America's Power Projection Army," in Envisioning Future Warfare, ed. Gordon R. Sullivan, and James W. Dubik (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command General Staff College Press, 1995), 29-42, p.

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34. I constructed this parallel to the army's new paradigm to the market place from each author's view of adapting to a changing paradigm.

14. Gordon R. Sullivan, "Ulysses S. Grant and America's Power Projection Army," in Envisioning Future Warfare, ed. Gordon R. Sullivan, and James W. Dubik (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command General Staff College Press, 1995), 29-42, p. 38. I paraphrased General Sullivan's requirement for the army to thoughtfully operate in an uncertain world.

15. Gene Calvert, Sandra Mobley, and Lisa Marshall, "Grasping the Learning Organization," *Training and Development* (June 1994), p. 41. I paraphrased this fearless characteristic of the learning organization. The authors develop the notion that learning organizations thrive on change and uncertainty.

16. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990) pp. 17-24; Michael Kirby, A715 Learning in Organizations, Book Outline of The Fifth Discipline (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), p. 13. I created this table from Senge's first chapter and LTC Kirby's course material in his A715 elective.

17. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990) pp. 5-11; Michael Kirby, A715 Learning in Organizations, Book Outline of The Fifth Discipline (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), p. 12. I created this table from Senge's first chapter and LTC Kirby's course material in his A715 elective.

18. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), pp. 88-90. Senge considers systems thinking the heart of his disciplines. I paraphrased his detailed argument.

19. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990) pp. 55-67; Michael Kirby, A715 Learning in Organizations, Book Outline of The Fifth Discipline (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), pp. 13-14. I created this table from Senge's discussion of learning disabilities and LTC Kirby's course material in his A715 elective.

20. Michael Kirby, A715 Learning in Organizations, Book Outline of The Fifth Discipline (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), p. 4. I paraphrased LTC Kirby's example of this learning disability.

21. Michael Kirby, A715 Learning in Organizations, Book Outline of The Fifth Discipline (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), p. 4. I paraphrased the author's use of the air force to this learning disability.

22. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 52.

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23. Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1991), p. 1.1.

24. J7, Joint Chiefs of Staff Brief, Development of Joint Doctrine, (School of Advance Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995) I paraphrased this notion on joint doctrine development from this briefing to AMSP and AOSF students.

25. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), p. xiii.

26. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), p. II.2.

27. Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1991), p. 4-1.

28. Ibid., pp.4.1-4.2.

29. Ibid., pp. 4.4.

30. Ibid., pp. 4.3-4.4

31. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. IV.9-10.

32. Robert Walls, Lesson 11, C320, Corps and Division Combat Operations (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), 24 Slides, pp. 2-8. I paraphrased this concept of the JTF acting as CINCs crisis response team from my lecture and course notes in C320.

33. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 8.

34. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), pp. 13.2-13.3.

35. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1994), pp. iv-v.

36. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 13.1.

37. Ibid., p. 13.4.

38. Robert Walls, Lesson 11, C320, Corps and Division Combat Operations (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994), 24 Slides, p. 8.

39. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp.

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84-85. Major Metz came to this conclusion during his examination of the JTF during this same time period.

40. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 24.

41. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp. 84-85. I summarized Major Metz's evaluation of the interagency expertise inherent in a JTF headquarters.

42. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 14-15.

43. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp. 84-84. I summarized Major Metz's conclusion that the Chief of Staff and CJTF's must create a competent staff. This concept is also reflected in the duties of responsibilities in JP 5-00.2, *Table 3*.

44. Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1994), pp. I-2.6-I-2.7.

45. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 14-15.

46 Ibid., p. EX.3.

47. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 234.

48. Ibid., p. 208.

49. Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), p. III.10.

50 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 176.

51. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), p. iii.

52. Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, Humanitarian Assistance "Provide Comfort", Number 92-6 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1992), p. 3.

53. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1993), p. 13.4.

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54. Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, 1994), pp. 14-15.

55. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), p. V.8.

56. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp. 61-62. I summarized Major Metz's evaluation of events in the former Kurdistan.

57. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. V.5-V.6. I summarized this publication's description of the phases of the operation in PROVIDE COMFORT.

58. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), pp. 64-65. I summarized Major Metz's evaluation of events in the former Kurdistan.

59. Funk & Wagnall's Corporation, "Somalia," in *Encarta 95*, ed. Microsoft Corporation (Funk & Wagnall's Corporation, 1995). I summarized from this CD Rom's description of events leading up to RESTORE HOPE.

60. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 13-14. I summarized this publication's description of the phases of the operation in RESTORE HOPE

61. Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, Humanitarian Assistance "Provide Comfort", Number 92-6 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1992); pp. 2-8. Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope, Volume I (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1993). Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1994). I consolidated these lessons learned from the above volumes. These are direct quotation, except I omitted some of the formatting in the document for ease of presentation in this table.

62. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), p. 341.

63. Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Uphold Democracy, Volume I (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1995), pp. xvii-xviii. I summarized this publication's description of events leading up to the US presence in Haiti.

64 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

65 Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Uphold Democracy, Volume I (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1995) Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Uphold Democracy, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1995) Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task

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Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1995)). I consolidated these lessons learned from the above volumes. These are direct quotation, except I omitted some of the formatting in the document for ease of presentation in this table.

- 66.J7, Joint Chiefs of Staff Brief, Development of Joint Doctrine, (School of Advance Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995) I paraphrased this notion on joint training and service mental models from this briefing to AMSP and AOSF students.
67. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 79.
70. Center for Army Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center, 1994), pp. 10-11.
71. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 79.
72. Colin Powell, "A Joint Doctrinal Statement" (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 7.
73. J7, Joint Chiefs of Staff Brief, Development of Joint Doctrine, (School of Advance Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1995) I paraphrased this notion on joint doctrine development from this briefing to AMSP and AOSF students.
74. I developed this notion of future OOTW simulations from Mr. John Hammond at the Battle Simulation Center 9 October 1995. Mr. Hammond is tasked to develop an OOTW simulation for PW 96 and other scenarios.
75. John. M. Metz, "Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 84-85. I obtained this fact that CINCs are already using the deployable JTF from Major Metz.
76. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Final Draft) (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 14-15. Clearly, this handbook is referring to the power of this organization in OOTW. I am making this statement, based upon my assumption of the JTF being the organization of choice to solve crises in the single superpower world.

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